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Abstract  Statistical analysis is often used to evaluate the evidence for or against scientific 
hypotheses, and various statistics (e.g., p-values, likelihood ratios, Bayes factors) are 
interpreted as measures of evidence strength. Here I consider evidence measurement from the 
point of view of representational measurement theory, and argue that familiar evidence 
statistics do not conform to any legitimate measurement scale type. I then consider the notion 
of an absolute scale for evidence measurement, in a sense to be defined, focusing particularly 
on the notion of absolute 0 evidence, which turns out to be something other than what one 
might have expected. 
 
1. Introduction  
Statistical analysis is common in the biological and social sciences, and certain statistical 
outputs are routinely understood in evidential terms.  The most commonly used evidence 
statistic (ES) is the empirical p-value (P); other familiar ESs include the maximum likelihood 
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ratio (MLR) and Bayes factor (BF)1.  Small values of P are routinely said to indicate strong 
evidence against a null hypothesis, with evidence strength taken to be stronger the smaller the 
value of P.  In the context of replication, failure to achieve a sufficiently small P on follow up 
is interpreted as indicating evidence against an initial finding. And scientific studies with 
results reported in terms of P are often summarized by the media with “study finds evidence 
of…”. 
One could argue that interpreting P in evidential terms is a mistake. What seems 
unarguable, though, is that statistical evidence is something scientists often want to measure, 
and it is something that scientists do measure, whenever they treat the numerical value of an 
ES as representing evidence strength. While we don’t usually think of it this way, this 
constitutes an act of measurement. Here I apply basic precepts of representational 
measurement theory (Hand 2004) in considering the measurement of statistical evidence. 
																																																								
1 P is the probability of obtaining data (or test statistic T) at least as extreme as the observed 
data (or T), assuming the null hypothesis H0 is true. MLR is the likelihood for the observed 
data assuming one hypothesis (H1) divided by the likelihood for those same data assuming 
another hypothesis (H2), where free parameters (i.e., parameters with unspecified values) are 
eliminated via maximization. For convenience I assume nested hypotheses (same parameters 
in numerator and denominator) with the number of free parameters in the numerator ≥ the 
number in the denominator. BF is the same as MLR, except that free parameters are 
eliminated via weighted averaging, which entails introducing prior probability distributions.  
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The paper is organized as follows.  In (2) I review distinctions among the three major 
types of measurement scales (ordinal, interval and ratio), then in (3) I consider the scale types 
of different ESs. (Spoiler alert: familiar ESs cannot be coherently assigned to any valid scale 
type.) In (4) I consider the absolute scale, a type of ratio scale usually only discussed in 
connection with temperature, focusing in particular on what makes the 0-point of some but 
not all ratio scales absolute. In (5) I explore 0-points for ESs. This leads, in (6), to a counter-
intuitive conclusion regarding absolute 0 evidence.  
 
2. Measurement Scale Types 
Measurements can be classified into different scale types, which can be characterized in (at 
least) two useful ways.  The first is by asking what we can do with them. To illustrate, 
suppose test subjects are asked to make a judgment of “more beautiful” or “less beautiful” in 
a series of pair-wise comparisons among n pictures of different faces. This allows a rank-
ordering of the pictures from least beautiful to most, and we can assign numbers (say, 1 to n) 
to represent this ordering. We can now compare faces with respect to rank-ordering, e.g., we 
can say “face #100 is judged to be more beautiful than #99.” However, it is not meaningful to 
ask whether the amount by which #100 is more beautiful than #99 is greater than the amount 
by which #50 is more beautiful than #49, or than #2 for that matter.  This is because nothing 
in the way we have constructed the scale allows us to interpret distances from one number to 
another in terms of underlying units of beauty. This illustrates ordinal measurement. What 
we can do with ordinal scales is to make comparisons regarding order, and nothing more. 
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A second way to characterize scale types is by asking what we can do to them. For ordinal 
variables, we can transform the original scale into any other set of symbols that preserves 
rank-ordering, e.g., we can replace our scale values 1,..,n with their respective logarithms.  
As long as the transformation preserves rank-order, it preserves the meaning of the original 
scale.   
The logarithmic transformation would no longer be meaning-preserving, however, if we 
interpreted the difference between numbers on the original scale as having meaningful units. 
For instance, the Fahrenheit temperature scale provides not only a rank-ordering of 
temperatures, but also assigns meaning to the unit: the difference in temperature between 
100°F and 99°F is the same as the difference in temperature between 50°F and 49°F. We can 
express this by saying that 1°F always “means the same”2 with respect to temperature. This 
illustrates an interval scale. What we can do with interval scales is to meaningfully make 
comparisons of order and also of differences.  As for what we can do to them, interval scales 
are amenable to any linear transformation (e.g., the formula converting °F to °C), because 
such transformations preserve both rank-order and a constant meaning for the unit across the 
																																																								
2 This is Hacking’s (1972, 136) phrase, from a passage critiquing the LR as an ES because no 
argument exists to show that a unit change in the LR always “means the same.”  
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scale range. The principal difference between °F and °C is in the size of the degree, or the 
thermal meaning of one degree.3  
A logarithmic transformation would disrupt this thermal meaning. 
Loge(100°F)−loge(99°F)=0.01 while loge(50°F)−loge(49°F)=0.02. Thus the same change in 
temperature (1°F) becomes represented by different numbers on the logarithmic scale. 
Application of a non-linear transformation to measurements made on an interval scale results 
in a “rubber scale,” for which the meaning of the unit changes across the range of the scale 
(Houle 2011). Clearly, comparing differences on a rubber scale is problematic, in much the 
same way that comparing differences on an ordinal scale is problematic.   
Ratio scales are interval scales with one additional feature: they count up from 0. Virtually 
all fundamental measurements in the hard sciences are on ratio scales, including length, 
weight, mass, etc. Measurements made on ratio scales can be compared with respect to order, 
differences, and also, ratios. For instance, temperature in degrees Kelvin (°K) has ratio scale 
type, which means that 20°K is twice as hot as 10°K (a ratio comparison). By contrast, such 
																																																								
3 That is, the difference in temperature between  100°F and 99°F (=1°F) is not the same as 
the difference in temperature between 100°C and 99°C (=1.8°F), but the difference in 
temperature between 100°C and 99°C and between 50°C and 49°C remains the same (viz., 
1°C, or 1.8°F). The two scales are also displaced relative to the freezing point of water 
(assigned 0°C and 32°F). 
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comparisons cannot be meaningfully made on the Fahrenheit (interval) scale; 20°F cannot be 
meaningfully said to be twice as hot as 10°F. The only arbitrary feature of a ratio scale is the  
size of the degree, that is, the amount of change in the object of measurement that we choose 
to assign to a one unit change on the measurement scale.  Thus for ratio scales, the only 
transformation that is meaning-preserving is multiplication by a positive constant.  Table 1 
(modified from (Houle 2011)) summarizes the major points of this section. 
Ideally, we would like to be able to say when one study’s evidence is twice as strong as 
another’s. Thus I assume we would prefer, if possible, to measure evidence on a ratio scale. 
 
Table 1 Overview of Measurement Scale Types 
 
Scale 
Type 
Domain Examples Meaningful 
Comparisons 
Permissible 
Transformations 
Ordinal ordered 
symbols 
personal 
preference 
order rank-order preserving  
Interval real numbers dates; temperature 
in °F or °C 
order, differences linear  
Ratio positive real 
numbers 
length; mass; 
temperature in °K 
order, differences, 
ratios 
multiplication by a 
positive constant 
 
3. ES Scale Types 
What can we say about the scale types of various ESs, e.g., P? When we interpret smaller 
values of P as stronger evidence against the null hypothesis (H0), we are treating P as 
providing a rank-ordering of evidence, i.e., as being at least ordinally scaled. In fact, we seem 
to consider P to be merely ordinal, because a common substitution for P in reporting results 
is −logP. The latter is useful for graphing purposes, as logarithmic transformations often are, 
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and it has the further advantage that, unlike P itself, larger values of −logP would correspond 
to stronger evidence. The MLR and BF are also treated as interchangeable with their 
respective logarithms.4 But logarithmic transformations of interval or ratio scaled variables 
create rubber scales, on which differences between measurement values are no longer 
meaningful.   
Either we must be prepared to view ESs as (merely) ordinal, or we must accept that we are 
working with rubber scales.  In neither case can we meaningfully compare differences, let 
alone ratios. But I would wager that virtually everyone – statistician, scientist and lay 
consumer of the scientific literature alike – interprets a change in P from, say, 0.05 to 0.04 as 
less exciting than a change from 0.04 to 0.001.  This implies that we believe we can 
meaningfully compare the difference 0.05−0.04 with the difference 0.04−0.001. If we are on 
an ordinal or rubber scale, however, such comparisons are insupportable.  
There is also widely-acknowledged incommensurability across ESs, that is, no conversion 
formula that would allow us to say, e.g., what value of the MLR indicates the same amount 
of evidence as P=0.05.  Moreover, while each ES provides a rank-ordering of studies or data 
sets, different ESs can return different rank-orderings, raising the question of which rank-
																																																								
4 Indeed the base of the logarithm is generally considered arbitrary in that it affects only the 
size of the degree, which is in a way true, but only as long as we are prepared to 
acknowledge that an ES is only ordinally scaled to begin with, in which case it was not 
meaningful to talk about the size of degree in the first place. 
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ordering is correct.  Indeed, different ESs can disagree with one another regarding the simple 
question of which of two hypothesis is favored by a given set of data. 
It is not difficult to see how this could be. P takes into account the probability distribution 
of all possible data, not just the data actually observed, assuming H0. The MLR considers 
only the observed data, and makes an explicit comparison between two hypotheses, H1 and 
H2. The BF compares H1 and H2 and additionally utilizes prior probability distributions.  But 
I am less concerned here with which of these notions of evidence, if any, is preferable, than I 
am with the proposition that the measure we ultimately choose should rest on a solid 
measurement theoretic foundation.  
 
4. Absolute Scales 
The designation absolute arises almost exclusively in connection with Kelvin’s temperature 
scale, which we may therefore take as paradigmatic of this scale type.5  Often the Kelvin 
scale is said to be absolute simply because it counts up from 0. But counting up from 0 is a 
																																																								
5 In measurement theory texts the probability scale is sometimes said to be absolute in the 
sense that no transformations are allowable (Houle  2011), but this is a different use of the 
term; multiplication by a positive constant is an allowable transformation for the Kelvin scale. 
Also, P is on the probability scale, but insofar as it measures evidence it apparently does so 
merely ordinally, at best.  
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feature of all ratio scales. Is there a sense in which 0°K is “absolute,” while, e.g., 0 length 
(say, in centimeters) is not? 
One way in which 0°K seems different from 0 length is that the lower bound6 for 
temperature is subject to empirical determination. For instance, Amontons inferred a lower 
bound by extrapolating from experimental data to find the temperature in the limit as 
pressure went to 0, and experiments aimed at achieving ever lower temperatures are ongoing 
to this day. Indeed the mere existence of a lower bound on temperature was far from obvious 
a priori: 
“Hot and cold, like fast and slow, are mere relative terms; and, as there is no relation or 
proportion between motion and a state of rest, so there can be no relation between any 
degree of heat and absolute cold, or a total privation of heat; hence it is evident that all 
attempts to determine the place of absolute cold, on the scale of a thermometer, must be 
nugatory.” (Rumford 1804, quoted by Chang 2004, 172) 
By contrast, neither the existence of a lower bound for length nor the question of which 
length ought to be assigned a value of 0 requires any investigation, or even any real thought. 
																																																								
6 In mathematical terminology, a lower bound is not a unique value, and in most occurrences 
in this paper a more proper nomenclature would be to refer to the greatest lower bound or 
infimum. But I also do not want to prejudge the issue of whether a measurement can actually 
=0. Therefore I will use the expression “lower bound” more colloquially, to simply refer to 
the bottom of the scale. 
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Then again, can an object have length=0?  Would it still be an object if it did? We might 
say that there is no such thing as a 0-length object, or perhaps there is. Nothing consequential 
seems to follow from a decision one way or another.7 The situation with temperature is 
different. Under Kelvin’s definition, 0 temperature corresponds to a fully efficient Carnot 
engine, and there is nothing in the theory that would prevent full efficiency from occurring; 
but on the other hand, the laws of thermodynamics break down at extremely cold 
temperatures.8  The most we can say is apparently Nernst’s law, which tells us that for any 
reversible process, the T=0 isotherm cannot be intersected by any adiabat other than the S=0 
isentrope (Callen 1985, 281). Never mind what that actually means. The point here is not to 
understand the physics, but only to note that if we want to resolve questions involving 0°K, 
then an understanding of physics is required.  
																																																								
7 We might want to preclude 0 length purely on the mathematical grounds that it disrupts 
ratio comparisons (what is twice as much as 0?). Indeed, this seems to be part of Rumford’s 
argument. In any case, the story turned out to be a lot more interesting for hot and cold than 
for fast and slow (velocity, which almost certainly can be 0), or length. 
8 Quantum theory precludes 0°K, but relating extremely cold quantum systems to 
thermodynamic theory is non-trivial in its own right.  Note also that so-called negative 
temperature on the Kelvin scale is a red herring: negative temperatures are actually warmer 
than their positive counterparts, so 0 remains the lower bound.  
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In short, we could say that 0°K is special, because it is interesting. The 0-point of 
temperature and its properties are neither obvious nor trivial to establish, but rather derive 
from careful study of the intended object of measurement. 0°K is absolute insofar as it is a 
lower bound established by physical laws, in a way that 0 length is not. Admittedly the 
distinction between 0-points for mundane ratio scales like length, and absolute minima like 
0°K, is a difference of degree (no pun intended) rather than kind. Issues of measurement 
scale always depend on the theoretical contexts in which they arise (Houle 2011). But some 
theoretical contexts are more complex than others.  
Thus the paradigmatic absolute scale, viz., the Kelvin scale, is simply a run-of-the-mill 
interval scale with lower bound of 0, with one twist: its 0-point is absolute in the sense of 
being part and parcel of the theory of temperature (thermodynamics) in the context of which 
the scale is defined. It is interesting to note, however, that Kelvin’s own conception of an 
absolute scale did not involve a 0-point at all. In fact, the first of his two temperature scales 
had no lower bound.  What Kelvin meant by an absolute scale was one that maintained 
constant meaning for the degree (unit) of temperature regardless of the substance being 
measured (Chang 2004).9   I return to this in the Discussion. 
																																																								
9 Interestingly, Kelvin’s second scale – the one now accepted as correct – turned out to be a 
linear transformation of the Celsius scale, implying that the °C “means the same” amount of 
temperature across the range of the scale. Therefore his first proposal, which was a non-linear 
transformation of Celsius, has to have been a rubber scale. 
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5. Minimal Evidence 
Above I argued that P, MLS and BF are each, at best, on merely ordinal scales. Thus the 
existence of 0-points for these ESs is moot. Let us, however, set the issue of scale type aside 
for the moment and simply focus on the meaning of 0 evidence. To do so I will, like the rest 
of the ES-computing statistical community, play fast and loose with issues of scale, but only 
temporarily, in order to motivate the notion of an absolute 0-point for an ES scale.  
P,  by virtue of its definition as a probability, has a minimum value of 0. However, this 
point is interpreted as maximum, rather than minimum, evidence strength.  The fact that the 
scale is “upside down” would not in itself be a problem for an interval scale, but we are 
concerned with a lower bound for a ratio scale.10  Following standard statistical practice, we 
can work with −logP, so that the minimum value of 0 is interpreted as the weakest possible 
evidence.  MLR is by definition ≥ 1 (assuming more maximization in the numerator than the 
denominator), that is, there is no such thing as MLR=0. As above, we can work around this 
																																																								
10 Some early temperature scales were oriented “upside down,” with higher readings 
corresponding to colder temperatures (Chang 2004). On first blush, orientation seems to be 
merely a matter of convention. However, a ratio scale requires that the lower bound  
correspond to the least possible amount of the object of measurement. 
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problem by taking the logarithm, so that we have minimum logMLR=0, a value interpreted 
as the weakest possible evidence.11   
The 0-points of –logP and logMLR are patently problematic. Consider a coin toss with 
probability θ that the coin lands heads and observed proportion y of heads on n tosses. For P, 
let H0:θ=½ (coin is fair); for MLR consider the hypothesis H1:θ≠½ (coin is not fair) in the 
numerator and H2:θ=½ in the denominator.  If y=½, then –logP=0 and logMLR=0. As n 
increases the evidence seems clearly to change (would you bet more on θ=½ after n=2 or 
n=100?), but these ESs remain constant at 0. That is, at the 0-point, the evidence changes 
with n but –logP=0 and logMLR=0 do not. A measure that fails to map changes in the object 
of measurement onto changes in scale values is inadequate in a fundamental way: it simply 
fails to capture the thing we set out to measure. 
The 0-point of the BF is more complicated, and more interesting. The lower bound of the 
BF is 0, but as with P, BF=0 cannot be interpreted as a lower bound on evidence.  When 
BF<1, smaller values are said to correspond to stronger evidence (in favor of the 
denominator hypothesis H2), whereas when BF>1, larger values are interpreted as stronger 
evidence (for H1). BF=1 demarcates the boundary (or transition point, TrP) between putative 
evidence for one hypothesis or the other, and differences from BF=1 in either direction are 
																																																								
11 Recall, however, that if P and/or MLR were on interval scales to begin with, we would 
now be working with rubber scales, while if –logP and logMLR were themselves on interval 
scales P and MLR would be on rubber scales. 
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taken to indicate increasing evidence. Thus BF=1 is interpreted as representing the minimal 
possible amount of evidence. Again, we can work with logBF so that the minimum value is 
0.12   
LogBF is distinct from –logP and logMLR in its ability to distinguish evidence for H1 
from evidence for H2 by virtue of the existence of a TrP, which the other ESs lack. This 
seems like a very nice feature of an evidence measure; even, arguably, a necessary one.  
However, it does complicate the issue of the 0-point. So let us first consider an artificially 
simple illustration.  
																																																								
12 The domain of logBF is (−∞, ∞), rather than the positive real numbers. This in and of itself 
does not preclude the interpretation of logBF=0 as the minimum evidence. Houle et al. 
(2011) discuss the signed ratio scale, where sign is used by convention to indicate direction. 
They give the example of a ratio-scaled measure of left-right symmetry, where sign is used to 
indicate whether the symmetry is measured from left to right or from right to left; another 
familiar example would be physical work, which is measured on a ratio scale under the 
convention that positive values indicate work done by a system while negative values 
indicate work done to a system. If logBF constituted a ratio scale (which it does not) for 
evidence in favor of H1, and also for evidence in favor of H2, then treating logBF as a signed 
ratio scale would maintain the interpretation of 0 as the minimum amount of evidence, with 
the sign indicating “direction” (favoring H1 or H2). Another option is to use the absolute 
value of logBF, |logBF|, as I do below. 
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Suppose we are interested in comparing H1:θ=¼ vs. H2:θ=¾.13 There are two ways we 
might find ourselves unable to say which hypothesis is favored: (i) we might have only 
irrelevant observations to go on, e.g., the number of times a die landed 3, which tells us 
nothing about θ; or (ii) we might have the relevant observation y=½, which is equally 
compatible, and equally incompatible, with either hypothesis, because it is exactly in the 
middle between them.  In both cases (i) and (ii), we have no basis for preferring one 
hypothesis over the other. But there is a distinction: we can roll the die as often as we like 
without affecting the evidence regarding the coin in the least; but as we continue to flip the 
coin another 20, 40 or 100 times, if we continue to observe y = ½, we are learning something 
about the hypotheses, namely that the strength of the evidence against both of them is 
increasing.14 
 Here y=½ corresponds to the TrP of logBF: the proportion of heads such that any smaller 
value would tip logBF to favor of H1 (logBF>0) while any larger value would tip logBF 
towards H2 (logBF<0). The value of logBF for y=TrP is 0, the lower bound of the |logBF| 
scale, and this is true regardless of n (Figure 1a). As with –logP=0 and logMLR=0, 
																																																								
13 This gives rise to a “simple” LR (SLR), in which there are no free parameters in H1 or H2, 
and BF=SLR. 
14 Of course the inherent stochastic variability of the binomial model, and its discreteness, are 
incompatible with a coin landing exactly y=½ (or y=TrP, see below) on every toss.  But this 
technicality does not undercut the gist of my argument. 
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interpreting |logBF|=0 as minimum evidence is therefore problematic, and in the same way: 
the amount of evidence we have (albeit evidence against both hypotheses) is changing with n, 
while |logBF| remains at its lower bound. Thus |logBF| fails to map changes in the object of 
measurement onto measurement changes. 
 
Figure	1	Transition	Point	(TrP)	of	|log	BF|	
 
Illustrations based on the coin-tossing example from the text for (a) H1:θ=¼ vs. H2:θ=¾; 
(b) H1:θ<½ vs. H2:θ=½ (uniform prior; one-sided comparison shown for simplicity). The 
TrP is the point at which |logBF|=0. Values of |logBF| to the left of the TrP (logBF>0) 
support H1, while values to the right (logBF<0) support H2. In (b), the TrP moves to the 
right as n increases. 
 
This example is special in that both hypotheses can be false (e.g., if the true value of θ=½), 
but the reasoning generalizes. Returning now to H1:θ≠½ vs. H2:θ=½, one or the other  
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hypothesis must be true (with a caveat, see below). This complicates the interpretation of the 
TrP as representing data that are equally incompatible with both hypotheses, but it leaves in 
tact the interpretation of data that are equally compatible with both.  In addition we have a 
mathematical complication, because now the value of y at which the TrP occurs changes with 
n (Figure 1b). This corresponds to the familiar phenomenon of smaller effects becoming 
“significant” as n increases.  
Again it seems that the evidence increases as n increases even when the data remain 
equally compatible with both hypotheses. But in this case, given that one or the other 
hypothesis must be true under the terms of the model, this would lead us to question the 
assumptions of the model (the aforementioned caveat).  We generally assume that θ remains 
constant as we toss the coin (binomial model), but there is no explanation under this 
assumption for a coin that consistently lands in a proportion corresponding to the TrP no 
matter how many times we toss it, given that the TrP itself is changing. By contrast, no 
matter how many times we roll the die and regardless of the outcomes, we would never be 
led on this basis to question the binomial model for the coin. The coin toss conveys evidence, 
even for y=TrP, in a way in which rolling the die does not. Thus, as with the other ESs, there 
are circumstances in which the evidence is changing with n, but |logBF| is “stuck” at its 
lower bound. 
 
6. Absolute Zero Evidence 
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If there is one thing that all statistical frameworks agree on, it is the principle that the less 
data we have the weaker the evidence, that is, that evidence decreases to its minimum as n→
0.15 And indeed as n→0, logBF→0 regardless of y. But we also have logBF(y=TrP )=0, so 
another way to get to 0 is by letting y→TrP.  
Two descriptions of the same 0-point is not in itself a problem. For instance, there are 
multiple recipes for bringing a physical system to (or very close to) 0°K, e.g., by letting 
entropy S→0 or pressure P→0.  But they all lead to the same state (viz., S≈0 and P≈0). The 
meaning of 0°K is the same regardless of how we describe the process of getting there.  The 
situation with logBF is not like this. We can approach logBF=0 by letting n→0 or by letting 
y→TrP,  but in the latter case n can be as large as we like. The two ways of getting to 0 lead 
to two different endpoints, or in other words, logBF=0 is being used to mean two different 
things.  
What we see is that in order for the 0-point of the scale to meaningfully correspond to the 
limit as n→0, the ES value at the TrP will have to change as a function of n, so that y→TrP 
only leads to minimal evidence when we also have n→0. The same reasoning applies, by the 
way, to logSLR, which also has a TrP such that logSLR(y=TrP)=0 for all n.  Thus it appears 																																																								
15 For the binomial distribution, min(n)=1. But the mathematical argument remains the same 
if we allow n to continuously approach 0.  A more general formulation is to say that evidence
→0 as the amount of relevant information in the data approaches 0.  
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that logSLR=0 also does not correctly represent minimal evidence. We have known for some 
time that the SLR fails to provide a meaningful measure of evidence strength, even while it 
permits us to determine which is the better supported hypothesis (Hacking 1972). What is 
new here is the idea that part of the problem is something fundamentally amiss with the 0-
point. 
If we arrive at logBF=0 via n→0, the 0-point coincides with minimal evidence; but if we 
arrive there via y→TrP then, as discussed in the previous section, the 0-point does not. That 
|logBF|=0 does not always represent the weakest possible evidence is a highly 
counterintuitive claim, particularly as no smaller value is possible. The surprising thing is 
that the ES values we have always taken to represent minimal evidence cannot be pressed 
into service as 0-points for a proper evidence measurement scale. Insofar as there exists a 
lower bound on strength of evidence, and surely there is one, it begins to look like that lower 
bound will be absolute, at least in the sense of being considerably more interesting than we 
had anticipated. 
 
7. Discussion  
A great deal of science relies on an activity that looks like measurement of evidence. But 
useful measurement requires a cogent measurement theoretic foundation. Since we would 
like to be able to make meaningful evidential comparisons of order, difference and ratio, 
what we need is a ratio scale. I argued above that the 0-points of familiar ESs (or their 
variously transformed counterparts) cannot be viewed as 0-points for a proper ratio scale for 
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evidence. I also argued that a proper ratio scale for statistical evidence measurement will 
need to be absolute, in the sense that determination of its 0-point apparently requires a better 
theory of evidence than what statisticians have relied on to date.  
But of course a meaningful 0-point alone is not sufficient for proper measurement. An 
absolute scale is, at the end of the day, simply an interval scale with a lower bound of 0 that 
is interesting in some way, and the hallmark of an interval scale is that the unit “means the 
same” across the range of the scale and across contexts of application. This returns us to the 
concept of absolute in a sense closer to Kelvin’s original intent. I have argued that none of 
the familiar ESs appear to be, or are even treated by statisticians as being, on interval scales. 
Of course, it is possible that one or another of them happens, by sheer luck, to maintain a 
constant evidential meaning for the unit. But lacking a cogent theoretical foundation, this 
seems exceedingly unlikely and in any event impossible to substantiate. 
How does one confirm constancy of the meaning of a unit for a theoretically constructed 
object of measurement?  Kelvin’s theory of temperature was entirely mathematical: the 
degree was defined in terms of ratios of heat for an ideal gas undergoing a Carnot cycle, a 
wholly fictional set-up that could not be implemented in the laboratory.  The constancy of the 
meaning of the unit was embedded in the mathematics, but for that very reason, unavailable 
to direct empirical verification. On the other hand, by Kelvin’s day there existed devices such 
as Amontons’ air thermometer, which seemed likely, based on clever experimentation, to be 
measuring physical temperature on an interval scale.  Thus Kelvin was able to validate his 
measurement scale empirically, to some extent, by aligning his calculations with the readings 
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of (apparently) interval-scaled measurement devices under carefully controlled experimental 
conditions approximating, though never achieving, the conditions of Carnot’s cycle.  
An entire book could be written, however, in explication of that casual clause “to some 
extent” in the previous sentence (indeed, vide Chang 2004!).  Constancy of the meaning of 
the °K as measured by actual thermometers was confirmed via a process, in Chang’s phrase, 
of epistemic iteration, which to this day leaves us short of certainty, but nevertheless with a 
rich and productive theoretical framework. The laws of thermodynamics take on their 
familiar, elegant form only when expressed as a function of temperature measured on the 
Kelvin scale, and that is the ultimate validation of the °K. But it remains an unassailable fact 
that there is no such thing as direct verification that any given measurement device is 
consistently measuring on the Kelvin scale, let alone doing so under all conditions of 
application.  
Kelvin had something else working in his favor, apart from reasonably good 
thermometers: he was among a community of scientists with a shared desire for a better 
understanding of temperature.  By contrast, it seems impossible to interest statisticians in the 
need for a better understanding of evidence. Perhaps this is because they view the very idea 
of measurement of evidence on a proper scale to be, in a word, nugatory. After all, how 
would we verify that one degree of evidence on any given measurement scale always “means 
the same” with respect to the evidence, without some independent way of knowing what the 
evidence is?  
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The point is well taken, but moot. Vindication of a theoretical measurement construct is 
not a matter of axiomatics. It happens by epistemic iteration, not in one fell swoop and never 
to the point of mathematical certainty. Perhaps the first step to solving the evidence 
measurement problem is understanding the limits on what demonstration of a solution would 
look like.  
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